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The UK has now embarked on an expensive, long and
controversial programme to replace Trident, beginning
with a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines to carry
the US-designed and built Trident missiles into the
2060s. Debate on whether and, if so, how to replace the
current system continues. It is this debate that provides
a significant opportunity for Labour under Ed
Miliband’s leadership to take further significant steps
towards controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and
strengthening UK national security. 
We face a global crisis of nuclear weapons diplomacy.
Nuclear weapons will spread if we continue to value
them as a currency of power and security. More
nuclear weapons in the hands of more states will
increase the risk of use. Any use of nuclear weapons
will cause an unprecedented humanitarian and
environmental catastrophe.  The spread of nuclear
weapons and the risk of their use is an inherent and
inescapable feature of the nuclear weapons world of
which we in the UK are a part. The only progressive
direction of travel in a globalised and interdependent
world is towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
Labour can lead in making a significant contribution
to this goal through a more progressive 21st century
nuclear policy. 
Ed Miliband stated at the 2012 Party Conference that
Labour’s policy on Trident replacement will be
reviewed after the publication of the Trident
Alternatives Study (July 2013) and the independent
British American Security Information Council
(BASIC) Trident Commission report due in summer
2014, stating: “We need to look at what are the
arguments around the Trident upgrade, how soon
does it have to happen and what are the alternatives,
and I think that is the right way forward.”1
Labour should remain open to a progressive nuclear
weapons policy in its 2015 election manifesto.
This briefing paper outlines the contours of such an
approach and responses to familiar concerns and
criticisms. The political constraints on a 2015 Labour
manifesto are very real, but we must reject the
suggestion that the nuclear status-quo is a wise and
acceptable choice for another generation.
A progressive UK nuclear policy is one that
acknowledges the realities of an evolving nuclear
security environment and the overwhelming British
interest in serious progress towards nuclear
disarmament. This means rethinking current
notions of ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’ in terms of
the size and operation of the UK’s nuclear arsenal. 
The rationale for such a nuclear course correction is
clear: 
1. The nuclear threat to the UK has diminished
considerably since Trident was procured. Successive
governments have all acknowledged we face no major
direct existential nuclear threat to our survival and
haven’t since the early 1990s when we de-targeted our
nuclear weapons. That is one third of the time we
have been a nuclear weapon state.
2. A nuclear weapons-free world and the continued
viability of the NPT are clear, long-term national
interests. The UK has a responsibility to adjust its
nuclear policy to reflect the declining utility of
nuclear weapons when opportunities arise, like now.
3. It is incumbent upon government to align stretched
defence resources to a suite of capabilities designed to
respond to the threats and risk we are likely to face in
the future. A like-for-like replacement of the Trident
system for extremely unlikely nuclear scenarios does
not represent sensible investment.
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The reality of nuclear use
The UK has stipulated that it would only ever consider
using nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances of
self-defence when the very survival of the state is at
stake.”2 Any conceivable use of nuclear weapons would
cause unimaginable human suffering. The
circumstances under which we would consider using
nuclear weapons are extremely narrow and relate to a
very small number of exotic scenarios involving an
existential nuclear or possibly biological threat to the
very survival of the state from a major power. The
much-reduced salience of nuclear weapons provides a
clear opportunity to further reduce the size and
posture of our nuclear arsenal.
The wider effect of a progressive 
nuclear policy 
A UK decision to further reduce its minimum nuclear
deterrence posture would demonstrate UK leadership
as a progressive force in global politics. It would send a
clear signal about the declining utility of nuclear
weapons for a still-powerful, influential and activist
country.
A progressive policy under Labour would reinforce
the vital Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) and its norm of progress towards
nuclear disarmament. A strong NPT is vital for British
and global security, but its legitimacy is undermined by
an indefinite discrimination between nuclear and non-
nuclear weapon states. A British decision that
maintains its current nuclear arsenal on permanent
alert can only reinforce the value of nuclear weapons
and weaken the treaty. Ending the continuous
deployment of nuclear weapons would lend important
support to the treaty.
The last Labour government worked hard to
position Britain as a progressive policy leader in
Europe, on climate change, on the global financial
crisis, on global poverty and development aid, and
on lifting the debt burden of the poorest countries,
particularly in Africa. Labour needs a progressive
nuclear weapons policy that supports this agenda. 
Ed Miliband stated at the 2012 Party Conference that
Labour’s policy on Trident replacement will be
reviewed after the publication of the Trident
Alternatives Study (July 2013) and the independent
British American Security Information Council
(BASIC) Trident Commission report due in Spring
2014, stating “We need to look at what are the
arguments around the Trident upgrade, how soon does
it have to happen and what are the alternatives, and I
think that is the right way forward”. Labour should
remain open to a progressive nuclear weapons policy
in its 2015 election manifesto.
The 2013 Trident Alternatives Review:
rethinking permanent nuclear alert
A progressive nuclear weapons policy means
rethinking current notions of ‘minimum deterrence’ by
ending the commitment to nuclear forces on
permanent alert ready to launch a nuclear attack and
further reducing the nuclear force. There is no
compelling strategic rationale for continuous
deployment of nuclear weapons. There is an
opportunity to end this practice and to make
additional reductions in the future stockpile of nuclear
warheads.
This was reinforced by the government’s Trident
Alternatives Review. It presented a hierarchy of nuclear
postures at decreasing levels of operational readiness. It
defined ‘focussed deterrence’ as a posture with
‘reduced readiness’ and the potential to return to
continuous patrolling for a specific period against a
specific adversary. Three postures at progressively
further reduced readiness were also outlined:
‘sustained deterrence’, ‘responsive deterrence’, and
‘preserved deterrence’. The Review then applied these
postures to four generic delivery systems: the Trident
ballistic missile and submarine combination; a new
cruise missile and warhead deployed aboard the UK’s
new Astute-class attack submarines; a nuclear bomb,
stealthy, or supersonic cruise missile for the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter the UK is procuring from the US; or a
stealthy cruise missile for a new large aircraft. The
Review concluded that “there are alternatives to
Trident that would enable the UK to be capable of
inflicting significant damage such that most potential
adversaries around the world would be deterred”,
though each of the systems had their weaknesses or
concerns.3
The credibility of a progressive 
nuclear weapons policy
Ending continuous patrolling is not a radical idea.
Former Chief of the Defence Staff Charles Guthrie,
former Foreign Secretary David Owen, former Defence
Secretaries Des Browne and Tom King, chair of
Commons Defence Committee James Arbuthnot, and
the late Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under
Secretary at MoD, have all questioned the strategic
necessity of continuous deployment of nuclear
weapons.
The case for continuous patrolling rests on several
problematic assumptions. It usually points to the
possibility that an adversary might contemplate a pre-
emptive strategic attack. 
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To do so, such a state would have to be absolutely
confident that:
1)  We could not retaliate, that all our nuclear warheads
had been destroyed or rendered undeliverable by
other means, at that point and for at least the
foreseeable future;
2)  The United States and other NATO allies would not
respond; and
3)  There would be sufficient advantage, measured
against the negative military, economic, political and
diplomatic consequences.
Some argue that a decision to re-instate continuous
patrols in crisis would risk unintentional escalation
leading to heightened chances of conflict. But any
decision to sail a nuclear-armed submarine would be
part of a major and general mobilisation of the UK’s
armed forces in the context of an existential military
threat to the survival of the state. The political signals
to an adversary would go far beyond the sailing of a
single nuclear-armed submarine. 
Electoral support
Nuclear weapons policy may not weigh heavily with
the electorate at present, but this could change. The
SNP will seek to use the issue for its own symbolic
messaging in the Scottish referendum in September
2014, and the Liberal Democrats may see electoral
advantage in raising the issue to distance themselves
from the Conservatives in the 2015 General Election.
This in turn opens up the question of where Labour
stands.
The majority of the public want the UK to ‘step down
the nuclear ladder’ and perceive Cold War rationales
for UK nuclear weapons as ‘out of touch’. This creates
political space for sensible policy innovation. Labour
has a clear opportunity to break from the past by
prioritising smart defence while providing a flexible,
‘value for money’ nuclear capability appropriate to
future threats, and demonstrating international
leadership on progress towards a world free of nuclear
weapons.
A survey of over 20 opinion polls on Trident since
2004 suggest UK public opinion has moved from
majority support for replacing Trident on a like-for-
like basis to a much more fluid picture. Majorities
against replacing Trident tend to increase when
respondents are presented with the government’s
recapitalisation cost of £20-25bn.4
The picture is complicated by the introduction in
some polls of a third option of a smaller, cheaper
alternative to a like-for-like replacement of the current
system. Data from these polls suggest a clear majority
wanting a smaller, cheaper system or no replacement at
all.
The polls also demonstrate that women, younger
people and non-Conservative voters are more inclined
to think nuclear weapons make the UK a less safe place
to live and favour a more progressive nuclear weapons
policy.
US perceptions
A progressive nuclear policy would not undermine the
UK’s commitment to NATO or the ‘special
relationship’. What appears to really concern the
United States is the impact of cuts to the UK’s
conventional armed forces. The New York Times
reported in April 2013 a ‘senior American official’
stating “Either they [the UK] can be a nuclear power
and nothing else or a real military partner”.5
The ‘specialness’ of the relationship with Washington,
however defined, is characterised by common values,
language, alliance and history, economic trade and
investment, intelligence cooperation, and interoperable
conventional military capabilities. Even as
Washington’s strategic focus shifts from the European
to the Pacific theatre, it stretches credibility to envisage
an abrupt disentangling of institutionalised defence
and intelligence arrangements that have endured for so
long on the basis of a decision to reduce the size and
alert status of our nuclear weapons.
A progressive nuclear policy 
aligned with current defence policy
The armed services are increasingly opting for flexible,
multi-use capabilities. The 2010 Strategic Defence and
Security Review divided the planned ‘Future Force
2020’ into four categories of readiness: the deployed
force; the high readiness force; the low readiness force’
and extended readiness. The review stated, “we will
hold some capabilities at what is known as extended
readiness. The capabilities… will be capable of being
reconstituted if we have strategic notice of possible, but
low probability, events to which we might have to
respond to protect our national security.”6 Over time
the nuclear force could be re-categorised as part of the
high, low, or even extended readiness force.
The UK could, for example, maintain a reduced
stockpile of Trident warheads ashore at RNAD
Coulport. Procedures could be tested during annual
exercises to re-mate warheads with missiles and
redeploy aboard a submarine. A new fleet of two or
three ballistic missile submarines would routinely
engage in other non-nuclear activities and operational
missions. Other credible options have also been
explored.7
Parts of the US nuclear arsenal have already been
operated in this way, demonstrating that it isits
operational practicabilityly achievable. 
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Final word
A global nuclear status quo is not an option: the
nuclear weapons world will evolve. Pressure for serious
progress toward nuclear disarmament is increasing as
non-nuclear-weapon states become ever more
frustrated with slow progress by the nuclear-weapon
states. The non-nuclear weapon states are looking for
significant steps that will radically devalue nuclear
weapons in the security policies of the weapon states,
and as a result are showing resistance to agreeing
essential non-proliferation measures. The non-nuclear-
weapon states elicited commitments at the 2010 NPT
Review Conference when, in the meeting’s final
document, the treaty parties, including the UK,
formally agreed “[t]o further diminish the role and
significance of nuclear weapons in all military and
security concepts, doctrines and policies” as part of a
64-point action plan.8
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Reducing the readiness of nuclear forces, or “de-
alerting”, is part of a package of measures long
advocated by non-nuclear-weapon states to diminish
the role of nuclear weapons. Ending continuous at-sea
deterrence in the UK and adopting a “reduced
readiness” posture with a smaller arsenal would
constitute an important qualitative change in nuclear
posture. 
The UK has made a number of valuable concrete
steps in the direction of disarmament over the past two
decades. An opportunity now exists for the UK to
continue on this trajectory and demonstrate
international leadership. This is eminently plausible in
an era of negligible strategic military threats to the
survival of the UK. 
The political moment is ripe for a Labour leadership
to fashion a progressive 21st century defence policy
that reduces reliance on the threat of indiscriminate
nuclear violence for national security. It comes at a
time when the strategic rationales for nuclear business-
as-usual are thin, the opportunity costs for the armed
forces are significant, public opinion is ambivalent or
hostile to the replacement programme, and the
commitment to the NPT and a desire to exercise
leadership on nuclear disarmament is strong. The next
Labour government should pursue a progressive
nuclear weapons policy as the next step down the
nuclear ladder towards a world free of nuclear
weapons.
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WMD Awareness
We are a UK-based coalition led by a small staff team
and a steering group of representatives from our partner
organisations. We raise awareness of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction, giving a fresh
perspective on the debate by encouraging young people
to get involved and have their say.  For more information
on our activities please visit our website:
www.WMDawareness.org.uk
BASIC 
BASIC (British American security Information Council)
is a small think tank based in Whitehall, London and in
downtown Washington DC taking a uniquely non-
partisan, dialogue-based and inclusive approach to
promoting global nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation. We look for ways to build constructive
engagement between individuals from different
geographical, political or cultural backgrounds on
traditionally sensitive or complex issues. And we create
space for new and diverse perspectives. In the UK we set
up and run the BASIC Trident Commission, intending to
report in the summer of 2014, and which is co-chaired by
Sir Malcom Rifkind, alongside Lord Browne of Ladyton
and Sir Menzies Campbell. We also operate throughout
Europe and the Middle East.  www.basicint.org
